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We set up a model to characterize the reaction functions of governments competing for 
mobile capital by simultaneously setting both the business tax rate as well as the level of 
provision of a productive public input. Using a rich data set of local jurisdictions, we then test 
the predictions of the model with respect to the nature of strategic interaction among 
governments. Our findings from efficient estimation of a system of spatially interrelated 
equations for both policy instruments support the notion that local governments use both the 
business tax rate and public inputs to compete for capital. In particular, we find that if 
neighbors cut their tax rates, governments try to restore competitiveness by lowering their 
own tax and increasing spending on public inputs. If neighbors provide more infrastructure, 
governments react by increasing their own spending on public inputs. 
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It is widely believed that national as well as local governments have powerful tools to
aﬀect the allocation of mobile capital, and that how these tools are used has signiﬁcant
consequences for the welfare of citizens. However, compared to the vast overall number of
factors typically regarded as crucial for private investors when deciding where to invest,
governments have mainly two sets of instruments at their disposal that directly aﬀect
investors’ choices: the taxation of businesses and the provision of public inputs. When
analyzing government behavior related to competition for capital, it thus seems natural
to assume that governments make use of both available instruments, and that the choices
aﬀecting the taxation of ﬁrms and decisions on public input provision will typically be
interdependent. Accordingly, a thorough analysis of how governments compete for mobile
capital should be based on analytical tools treating the relevant business tax rates and
infrastructure investments as jointly determined policy instruments.
The theoretical literature has pointed to the role of taxes and infrastructure investments
as joint determinants of private investment early on. Extending the analysis of Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986), Keen and Marchand (1997) have shown that in the presence
of a productivity-enhancing public good the composition of public spending tends to be
systematically biased towards a relative overprovision of public inputs compared to public
goods which are consumed directly by residents. Focusing on the strategic choice of policy
instruments, Buettner (1999) has suggested a model where governments optimize over tax
rates and shares of income that are spent on productive public goods. More recently,
Hindriks et al. (2008) have presented a framework in which the level of public inputs is
chosen in the ﬁrst stage of a game while the tax rate is determined in the second. This
dynamic setting implies an incentive for governments to underinvest in public inputs in
order to alleviate second-stage tax competition.
In contrast to the aforementioned contributions, the bulk of theoretical work on ﬁscal
competition has treated the cases of pure tax competition and expenditure competition
separately. While Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Wilson (1986), and Wildasin (1988) have
discussed the issue of ineﬃciently low equilibrium tax rates and a corresponding underpro-
vision of consumptive public goods, Taylor (1992) and Bucovetsky (2005) have dealt with
2the problem of overprovision of public infrastructure. The related empirical literature has
been dominated by applications testing for the strategic choice of business tax rates, mostly
ignoring the issue of public inputs.1 Early contributions include Brueckner and Saavedra
(2001), Buettner (2001), and Hayashi and Boadway (2001).
Building on much of the theoretical as well as empirical work mentioned above, we oﬀer a
comprehensive treatment of tax and public input competition, with a focus on the strategic
behavior of governments in choosing both policy instruments. In our theoretical model, the
governments of two symmetric jurisdictions compete for mobile capital by simultaneously
setting both the business tax rate as well as the level of provision of a productive public
input. The public input makes private capital more productive and can thus be used by
governments to attract investment. On the other hand, providing public inputs is costly.
We characterize the reaction functions for both policy instruments and show that govern-
ments react to tax cuts in the other jurisdiction by cutting their own tax rate and providing
more public inputs. If the other jurisdiction improves its infrastructure, governments lower
the business tax rate and increase the provision of public inputs. We then proceed with
an empirical test of the nature of strategic behavior of governments with autonomy to set
a business tax rate and to provide a productive public input. Using a rich data set of lo-
cal jurisdictions in Germany, we estimate an empirical counterpart of the two-dimensional
system of ﬁscal reaction functions. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the ﬁrst
empirical analysis of tax and public input competition that allows for taxes and spending
on infrastructure to be jointly determined endogenous variables. Building on recent work
of Kelejian and Prucha (2004), we run a four-step systems estimation approach for spa-
tially interrelated equations. Our approach is very general. First of all, it allows for both
policy instruments to depend on tax rates and public inputs in neighboring jurisdictions.
Secondly, we treat the business tax rate as a function of a government’s own level of public
input provision, and vice versa. Thirdly, it accounts for potential cross-sectional correlation
in unobservables and potential cross-equation correlation of residuals.
1One of the few empirical studies acknowledging the joint impact of taxes and public infrastructure
on the allocation of private capital is B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e et al. (2007). They investigate FDI ﬂows from the
U.S. to several European countries and ﬁnd that both the corporate tax rate and the stock of public
capital are signiﬁcant in explaining inward FDI. In contrast to their study, we take the responsiveness of
investment to inter-jurisdictional diﬀerences in tax rates and public infrastructure as given and explore
whether governments make use of taxation and public inputs as strategic instruments to attract private
capital. A further study providing some related evidence on OECD countries is Gomes and Pouget (2008).
3The picture of local government behavior that emerges from our estimations is much more
complex than suggested by previous empirical work on ﬁscal competition. Across various
speciﬁcations, our ﬁndings suggest that governments set both the business tax rate and
the level of public input provision strategically, i.e. they set both instruments taking into
account the respective choices of competing governments. In particular, we ﬁnd that local
governments tend to adjust their business tax rate towards levels chosen in neighboring
jurisdictions. Moreover, if neighbors increase their spending on the local infrastructure,
governments react by strongly increasing their own spending, too. Finally, our results
suggest that a government’s level of spending on public inputs is also aﬀected by the tax
rates of neighboring jurisdictions, with the sign of the eﬀect as predicted by the theoretical
model. Treating taxes and public inputs as alternative means to attract capital thus reveals
that local governments react to competition by other jurisdictions in a rather ﬂexible way:
municipalities experiencing a boost in local infrastructure investment in neighboring com-
munities will, on average, raise the level of public input provision, too. If neighbors choose
to lower the tax burden on locally installed capital, municipalities will adjust both the tax
rate and the spending on infrastructure to restore competitiveness. All these empirical
ﬁndings are in line with the predictions of our theoretical model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our theoretical model of tax and
public input competition. Section 3 describes our estimation approach and presents evi-
dence based on data on local jurisdictions in Germany. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2 The model
Our theoretical analysis of tax and public input competition builds on the literature on
strategic tax competition in the tradition of contributions such as Wilson (1991), Wildasin
(1991) and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). In these models, governments compete for
capital which is in ﬁxed supply, and countries are large enough to have an inﬂuence on
each other’s optimal behavior. We extend this model of pure tax competition by allowing
for public inputs as a second strategic policy instrument. Our aim is to characterize the
model’s reaction functions, describing how governments react with both instruments to
the respective choices of a competing jurisdiction. Since we want to account for strategic
4interaction across instruments, we let governments simultaneously set taxes and spending
on the public input. The governments in our model thus compete by choosing a mix of
instruments capable of attracting mobile capital. The simultaneity in the choice of ﬁscal
policies, which rules out commitment eﬀects emerging in a setting with sequential moves,
is what diﬀerentiates our model most from the framework used by Hindriks et al. (2008).
We consider a federation of two symmetric jurisdictions, labeled i = 1,2. In each jurisdic-
tion, production of a homogeneous consumption good takes place, using perfectly mobile
capital ki and a publicly provided input, gi. The public input is of the factor-augmenting
type and raises the marginal productivity of the primary input factor. To keep the model
tractable, we use a simple quadratic production function of the form





where a and b are parameters. Governments levy per unit taxes ti on capital employed
in their jurisdiction. With capital perfectly mobile across regions, the arbitrage condition
requires its net return to be equalized such that
F
0
i(ki,gi) − ti = F
0
j(kj,gj) − tj, (2)
where F 0
i denotes the marginal product of capital. With the world capital stock denoted
as k, we can solve (2) for the capital employed in i,
ki =
kb + gi − gj − ti + tj
2b
. (3)
Equation (3) shows how a government’s own choice regarding t and g aﬀects its tax base,
and that making use of the instruments involves ﬁscal externalities. Note that due to the
















The governments are assumed to maximize welfare in their own jurisdiction. Assuming
absentee ownership of capital,2 we deﬁne the objective function of the government in i to
be
Ui = Fi(ki,gi) − F
0




2This simpliﬁes the algebra, but all our main results hold if we allow for domestic ownership of capital.
5where the ﬁrst term captures total output, the second capital income of foreign owners,
the third local tax revenue, and the fourth the cost of public input provision.
While the ﬁrst three terms are straightforward, the expression capturing the cost of pro-
viding the productive input requires some discussion. First of all, including the cost of
public input provision in the welfare function instead of imposing a budget constraint im-
plies (realistically) that governments do not rely exclusively on capital taxes as the source
of funding public inputs. Secondly, the speciﬁcation avoids the need for a further policy
instrument. Otherwise, with two instruments and the requirement to balance the govern-
ment’s budget, only one policy instrument could be set strategically.3 The convex cost of
supplying the public input captures a congestion externality in the use of the public input.
Accounting for such an externality is motivated by two facts: ﬁrst of all, the presence of
congestion externalities seems to be a natural assumption with regard to common public
inputs like road networks, telecommunication infrastructure or land for business parks.4
Secondly, the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game
with taxes and public inputs is only guaranteed in general if the latter is crowded to some
degree (Petchey and Shapiro, 2008). The intuition for our speciﬁcation of the congestion
externality is that, for any given level of g, the welfare costs of providing it are higher
the more it is used, i.e. the ‘relative’ costs of providing public inputs are convex. Stated
diﬀerently, we assume that governments trying to ensure an adequate provision of g for any
unit of k will see the costs of g rising with k. This is a standard way of modelling crowd-
ing externalities in the context of local public inputs (Matsumoto, 2000).5 In anticipation
of our empirical example involving jurisdictions providing a local road network, one might
think of an increase in the number of vehicles to lead to a more than proportionate increase
in the need for roads due to nonlinearities in congestion eﬀects. Alternatively, one could
argue that the maintenance costs of public infrastructure increase as it is being used more
3As ﬁrst discussed by Wildasin (1991), equilibria in ﬁscal competition games with two instruments
related via a budget constraint crucially depend on which instrument is set strategically. See Bayindir-
Upmann (1998) for an exploration with taxes and public inputs as policy instruments.
4Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) provide evidence suggesting that most local public goods are con-
gestible. Craig (1987) ﬁnds substantial congestion eﬀects using the example of police services, and Fernald
(1999) shows that after 1973, with the U.S. Interstate Highway system being well-established, an increase
in total miles driven reduced road services to individual producers signiﬁcantly.
5An alternative would be to include the congestion externality in the production function (see Buettner,
1999). While this does not change the intuition for the crowding eﬀect, it makes the algebra signiﬁcantly
more involved.
6heavily. With respect to the speciﬁc functional form of the cost term, we follow Hindriks
et al. (2008) by using a simple quadratic form. This constitutes a straightforward way to
introduce cost convexity while keeping the model tractable.






i(gj − gi + ti − tj) + b(gi − g
2
ik − gj + 3ti + tj)], (6)
where δi ≡ kb + gi − gj − ti + tj. Our main interest lies in the slopes of the tax and public
input reaction functions, ti = ft(tj,gj) and gi = fg(tj,gj), around the equilibrium. In most
of the literature, policy instruments are referred to as ‘strategic substitutes’ if the derivative
∂2Ui/(∂xi∂xj) is negative, and as ‘strategic complements’ if it is positive, where x denotes
an instrument at players’ disposal. With just one instrument, this translates one to one
into negatively and positively sloped reaction functions, respectively. This is, of course,
no longer true in our case as a government will generally ﬁnd it optimal to respond to a
marginal policy change by its competitor using both instruments. Taking account of this,
to obtain the slopes of the tax and public input reaction functions, we proceed by totally
diﬀerentiating the governments’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ti and gi. In general







































Since we assume jurisdictions to be identical, we follow the common practice to focus on
the symmetric equilibrium characterized by ti = tj = t and gi = gj = g. Using the speciﬁc
values of all the derivatives (note that we have relegated most formal derivations to the




















k(bk + g(4 − 3gk))
16b2 , (9)
7where |H| denotes the determinant of the Hessian (it is shown in the appendix that |H| is
positive). Note that the symmetries in dti/dtj and dti/dgj as well as dgi/dgj and dgi/dtj
are driven by the fact that, as shown in (3), the absolute values of the marginal changes in
the tax base are equal across instruments.
To sign the slopes of the reaction functions, we make use of the values for g and t in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium, which turn out to be g∗ = 2/k and t∗ = (bk2+4)/(2k) (see the
appendix for derivations and discussion of stability).6 If we evaluate (8) at the symmetric










3bk2 < 0. (10)
The expressions in (10) show that if the opponent deviates from the symmetric equilib-
rium by increasing its supply of public inputs, a region will ﬁnd it optimal to respond by
supplying more g, too. Moreover, a region will also react by providing more of the costly
input if the opponent competes for capital by cutting its tax rate.
Evaluating (9) in equilibrium, we see that the signs of the reactions in taxes depend on b,











Hence, the ﬁnding of Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) that the slope of the reaction function
in a model of pure tax competition cannot be signed unambiguously carries over to our







Under the given restriction on b, the optimal reaction to a decrease in the opponent’s tax
rate is to decrease taxes and to increase public input provision. Similarly, if the opponent
provides more public inputs, it is optimal to increase provision, too, and to cut the tax rate.
Inspection of (10) and (11) reveals that the smaller is b, the stronger will be the reaction in
public inputs and the smaller will be the reaction in taxes. This is intuitive, as the following
example demonstrates: imagine region j becomes a tougher competitor for mobile capital
6Note that with absentee ownership, capital has a participation constraint, namely that its net of tax
return has to be positive, F0(ki,gi)−ti > 0. This condition reduces to a > bk, a mere parameter restriction.
8by raising gj. The government in i can respond to this with its two instruments, ti and
gi, and will typically use both. The reason for the crucial role of b is that it determines
the curvature of the production function, thereby driving the residual income the country
earns (after having paid the mobile factor its marginal product). This residual income is,
besides tax revenues, the reason why a country is interested in attracting capital in the ﬁrst
place. If b is very small, the production function is almost linear, rendering the residual
income small and the motive to tax local capital comparatively more important. For i’s
government it will then be optimal to respond to the increase in gj by a relatively strong
increase in gi, thereby defending its tax base, and by an increase in its tax rate ti. With
a larger b, the residual income becomes more signiﬁcant, strengthening the incentive to
attract capital for its direct contribution to the region’s welfare. If b is suﬃciently large,
the optimal response to an increase in gj will therefore be to lower ti and still increase the
costly gi.
Formally, the rationale for requiring b > 4/k2 can be seen from the components of a region’s










Evaluating this expression at the symmetric Nash equilibrium shows that the condition
b > 4/k2 is equivalent to the requirement that the residual income is larger than the cost
of providing g. If this condition is not met, the welfare eﬀect of attracting additional units
of capital is negative once we net out the contribution of tax revenue. This makes the
motive to raise tax revenue so strong that governments will react to increased competition
by increasing their tax rate. Hence, imposing the condition b > 4/k2 essentially means
to restrict attention to situations where ﬁscal policies are driven by a motive to attract
investment as an income-generating factor and, at the same time, to raise tax revenue.
Eﬀectively, the condition ensures that governments react to policy changes in the competing
jurisdiction by adjusting both ﬁscal policy instruments such that the adjustment in each
instrument contributes to oﬀsetting the resulting change in a region’s relative attractiveness
for private capital.
To get an intuition for the role of the congestion externality in shaping the strategic be-
havior of governments, consider the reason for the sign of dgi/dgj to be positive: with the
9congestion externality in place, attracting additional units of capital drives up the cost for
the public input. For governments, this aﬀects the optimal ﬁscal policy mix by making the
attraction of capital less and using the tax instrument to generate revenue more attractive.
Hence, the congestion externality alleviates tax competition. With higher taxes, the tax
base eﬀect becomes more important, inducing governments to respond with an increase
(decrease) in public input provision to a corresponding increase (decrease) abroad.
In the following, we suggest an approach to estimate empirical counterparts of the tax and
public input reaction functions of local jurisdictions. Since the congestion externality in the
use of the public input is a distinctive feature of our model, we use an example where such
externalities arise quite naturally: the provision and maintenance of a local road network.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimation Approach
To accommodate strategic government behavior as implied by our model, our estimation
approach must be ﬂexible enough to allow for tax rates and public inputs to be determined
simultaneously. Moreover, the design of the empirical model needs to account for the inter-
dependence of all jurisdictions’ choices regarding taxes and inputs, i.e. each jurisdiction’s
tax rate as well as the level of inputs provided to attract mobile capital should be allowed
to depend on both taxes and inputs of all other jurisdictions.
Our structural empirical model builds on ti = ft(tj,gj) and gi = fg(tj,gj) as the general
form reaction functions of the tax and public input competition model. To facilitate es-
timation, we make use of linearized versions of these functions and deﬁne the following
system of equations,
τi = θτsi + λττ−i + ϕτs−i + βτXτi + ui (14)
si = θsτi + λsτ−i + ϕss−i + βsXsi + vi, (15)
where τ denotes the tax rate and s a jurisdiction’s spending on the public input, τ−i =
P
j wijτj and s−i =
P
j wijsj indicate the average tax rate and average inputs of other
10jurisdictions, weighted by the predetermined weights wi1,...,wiN, and Xτi and Xsi denote
vectors of control variables (including a constant) in the tax and input equation, respec-
tively. The variables entering both Xτi and Xsi are subsets of a set of exogenous variables,
Xi = (x1i,...,xKi).
Note that in specifying our system of equations, we include si among the right-hand side
variables of the tax equation and τi as an explanatory variable in the input equation. In
doing so, we deviate from the usual approach to use counterparts of reduced-form reaction
functions when estimating models of ﬁscal competition with more than one choice variable
(see Devereux et al., 2008). The reason for allowing a government’s own policy instruments
to appear as explanatory variables is that we want the empirical model to allow for the
fact that governments are not always free to adjust both instruments to optimal levels. For
instance, governments might face political costs when frequently changing the business tax
rate, and prefer to keep the tax rate constant if the diﬀerence between the optimal rate and
the rate actually implemented is suﬃciently small. Taking into account the eﬀect on the
government’s budget, the optimal choice of public inputs should then be modeled as being
conditional on a given business tax rate. A similar argument can be made with respect to
public inputs, where investments often require considerable planning eﬀort. As a result, it
may take some time until a government can adjust its stock of public capital to the desired
level. Again, this may aﬀect the government’s budget and, thereby, the tax rate.
Apart from modeling tax rates and inputs to be interrelated both within and across juris-
dictions, we also allow for cross-sectional dependence in the disturbances u and v,
ui = ρuu−i + i and vi = ρvv−i + εi, (16)
where u−i =
P
j wijuj and v−i =
P
j wijvj. The innovation vectors  and ε are assumed to
be identically and independently distributed with zero mean. Hence, we require that the in-
novations are free of spatial correlation. Note, however, that we allow for contemporaneous
cross-equation correlation among innovations of the same cross-sectional unit.
Following most of the literature on tax competition among local jurisdictions, we choose
a spatial metric which accounts for the physical distance between jurisdictions. Moreover,







where nij is an indicator for neighbors of i (with nii = 0) and popj is j’s population.
To determine which jurisdictions are ‘neighbors’ of a given community, we either use a
maximum great circle distance between the centroids of jurisdictions, or we apply an mth-
nearest-neighbors criterion, deﬁning as neighbors the m nearest jurisdictions in terms of
physical distance.
While our speciﬁcation of the empirical reaction functions is more general than the com-
monly employed reduced-form version, it also makes the estimation of the parameters of
interest more involved. In fact, allowing the choice variables to appear as explanatory vari-
ables means that we have to deal with a total of four endogenous explanatory variables:
si, τ−i, and s−i in the tax equation, and τi, τ−i, and s−i in the public input equation. To
account for all endogeneity problems and to achieve eﬃcient estimation, we use the spatial
system estimator proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (2004). In the following, we brieﬂy
outline the four step estimation procedure.
As the initial step, we run a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure separately on the
tax and the input equation, treating τi, si, τ−i and s−i as endogenous regressors. We
use the same set of instruments in both estimations, containing x1i,...,xKi as well as the
corresponding ﬁrst and second order spatial lags. In matrix notation, they can be written as
WX1,...,WXK,WWX1,...,WWXK, where W denotes the N-dimensional square matrix
of weights. Using the residuals of the ﬁrst stage, in the second step of the procedure the
spatial auto-regressive parameters ρu and ρv are estimated by the generalized moments
method originally suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999). The estimates of the spatial
auto-regressive parameters are then used in the third step to perform a Cochrane-Orcutt-
type transformation of the structural equations to remove the spatial error correlation
and to re-run 2SLS on the transformed system. While the third-step estimation takes
into account potential spatial correlation, it does not take into account the cross equation
correlation in the innovation vectors. To utilize the full system information, in the fourth
step we apply a systems instrumental variable estimator, which is eﬃcient relative to the
ﬁrst and third stage single-equations estimators.
12For several reasons, the systems estimation approach outlined above seems to be the ideal
choice for estimating our tax and public input competition model. First of all, the procedure
takes account of the fact that both taxes and public inputs are determined simultaneously.
Secondly, it allows for contemporaneous interaction between jurisdictions in a very general
way. In addition, it is easy to implement even in large samples, a distinctive advantage
over maximum likelihood procedures.
The evidence reported in this study is derived from cross-sectional estimations. There are
several reasons why panel estimations do not constitute a feasible option. First of all,
the systems estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (2004) is designed for cross-sectional data.
A straightforward way to account for unobserved heterogeneity would be to apply the
estimation routine to panel data and to include a series of jurisdiction-speciﬁc constants as
ordinary regressors. With more than 1,000 cross-sectional units, however, computational
limitations hindered us to estimate panels with a reasonable time dimension. Based on
short panels of up to four years, we were unable to identify the coeﬃcients of interests with
reasonable precision. The likely reason is that many variables, including the tax rate, show
only limited variation over time. As in many related applications, it is thus diﬃcult to
achieve identiﬁcation in a ﬁxed eﬀects framework with a small number of cross-sections.
3.2 Data
The data used to estimate our empirical model of tax and public input competition come
from a sample of 1100 German municipalities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, cov-
ering the period 1998-2004. Note that we exclude independent cities from the sample (10
cross-sectional units), which face diﬀerent incentives within the municipal system of ﬁscal
equalization. As we will see, the treatment within this redistributive grant system exerts
a strong impact on local tax and spending decisions. In the following, we brieﬂy comment
on the data which are summarized in Table 1.
As already pointed out, German municipalities have taxing autonomy with respect to the
business tax (Gewerbesteuer), essentially a tax on local business earnings. In the time
period under consideration, the statutory tax rate in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg av-
eraged 0.167 and varied between 0.145 and 0.21. Besides revenues from the local business
13Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Statutory tax rate, τ 0.167 0.006 0.145 0.210
Spending for local roads per capita, s 130 92.8 0.815 1739
Marginal contribution rate 0.132 0.011 0.088 0.145
Unconditional transfers per capita 300 50.3 96.5 447
Fiscal capacity 0.714 0.272 0.276 6.35
Speciﬁc grants for local roads per capita 27.3 53.7 -76.5 1730
Other speciﬁc grants per capita 57.4 33.0 -3.92 282
Debt service per capita 10.6 35.2 -858 280
Population (1,000s) 7.81 10.7 0.101 112
Population densitya 0.300 0.302 0.017 2.50
Unemployment 0.062 0.013 0.025 0.127
% population<16 years 0.181 0.022 0.101 0.300
% population>65 years 0.155 0.027 0.071 0.347
% church members 0.891 0.053 0.706 1.04
a (total population)/1000 per square kilometer; Nob=7700 (1100 municipalities from 1998 to 2004, independent cities ex-
cluded); Fiscal variables in Euros (prices of 2000). Source: Statistical Oﬃce of Baden-Wuerttemberg and own calculations.
tax, grants and federal tax revenue sharing play an important role in municipal ﬁnancing.
In our context of tax and public input competition, ﬁscal equalization grants deserve spe-
cial attention, as redistributive grant systems aﬀect the incentive of local governments with
respect to tax and expenditure policies. The theoretical literature on the internalizing ef-
fects of ﬁscal capacity based equalization suggests that the implementation of redistributive
grant systems tends to weaken tax and public input competition (e.g., see Koethenbuerger,
2002 and Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006). Recent empirical evidence for Germany (Buettner,
2006; Egger et al., 2007) supports the view that tax rates tend to rise when the degree
of equalization increases. Following Buettner (2006), we therefore include two control
variables in our regressions to account for substitution and income eﬀects of equalization
grants. The marginal contribution rate describes to which extent an increase in the tax
base reduces the equalization transfers received. For the period between 1998 and 2004 the
average rate was 13.2% with a maximum value of 14.5% and a minimum of 8.8%. Relating
the marginal contribution rate to the tax rate reveals an average equalization rate of around
80%. As a means to control for pure income eﬀects we include unconditional transfers cap-
turing the amount of transfers a municipality would receive if its tax base were actually
zero. This includes equalization transfers and the municipal share of statewide income and
value added taxes.
14Furthermore, since diﬀerences in taxing capacity may aﬀect local tax and expenditure
policies, we account for a municipality’s relative ﬁscal capacity. This variable is calculated
by relating a municipality’s ﬁscal capacity (comprising the local business tax base as well as
other revenue sources, in particular the share of statewide income and value added taxes)
to its ﬁscal need, calculated by multiplying a predeﬁned per capita spending need with the
municipality’s population size. The relative ﬁscal capacity shows values between 28% and
635% with an average value of 71.4%.7
In our analysis, public input provision is deﬁned as spending on the municipal road net-
work. Between 1998 and 2004, municipalities have spent, on average, 130 Euros per capita
(in prices of 2000) on the construction and maintenance of local roads. A standard devia-
tion of 93 Euros per capita indicates substantial variation in this expenditure category. As
municipalities receive grants in order to fulﬁll their self-administrated spending responsibil-
ities, we explicitly control for speciﬁc transfers in the spending category ‘local roads’. This
includes grants within the so called ‘traﬃc and transport burden sharing’ (Verkehrslaste-
nausgleich), which depend on the length of the road network and the size of the municipal
area. In addition, we include other speciﬁc grants independent of the tax base in order
to control for the corresponding income eﬀects. Other conditioning variables capturing
local characteristics include debt service, population size and population density as well as
the population share of the young (less than 16 years) and the elderly (above 65 years).
Furthermore, we also include the unemployment rate as a proxy for the general demand for
spending on social services. Finally, drawing on Buettner (2001), we include the share of
the population that is aﬃliated with one of the three major Christian churches (Catholic,
Protestant State, and Protestant Free Church) as well as two variables that interact this
proportion with the rate of unemployment and the share of elderly people, respectively.8
The inclusion of these variables is warranted as the religious orientation of the population
may indicate preferences regarding the provision of local public goods and, in particular,
social services and welfare. The interactions account for the possibility that, depending
7See Buettner (2006) for further details on the municipal system of ﬁscal equalization in the state of
Baden-Wuerttemberg.
8Data on religious aﬃliation is available only for 1987. The slight imprecision in the count of church
members relative to overall population (10 municipalities with a reported share of church members higher
than one) is known from other studies using the same data. Excluding municipalities with implausible
ﬁgures does nothing to our estimation results.
15on the strength of religious orientation, an increase in the number of potential welfare
recipients may have diﬀerent eﬀects on the socially preferred level of social services.
The fact that both the tax rate and public inputs appear as explanatory variables in our
system of equations requires to use some of the exogenous characteristics as instruments
for these variables. Technically, this is achieved by imposing exclusion restrictions with
respect to a subset of the exogenous variables on both equations. An exclusion restriction
for the tax equation is suggested by the system of speciﬁc grants. As speciﬁc grants for the
construction and maintenance of local roads amount, on average, to only 1.2% of overall
expenditures, the business tax rate should be independent of the level of these grants. To
the contrary, we expect grants for local roads to signiﬁcantly aﬀect actual spending on the
local road network. Consequently, we include speciﬁc grants in the public input equation,
but exclude it from the tax equation. Note that other speciﬁc grants amount to 57.4 Euros
per capita, twice as much as speciﬁc grants for local roads. We therefore include other
speciﬁc grants in both equations to account for potential income eﬀects.
Regarding the exclusion restrictions for the public input equation, note ﬁrst that local roads
are not only used as public inputs by ﬁrms, but are also consumed by private households.
A change in infrastructure spending will therefore have direct as well as indirect eﬀects on
the utility of residents. In contrast, a change in the business tax rate will aﬀect households
only indirectly. This suggests to exclude the variables describing the religious orientation of
the local population and related preferences regarding spending on social services from the
input equation. We thus assume that a stronger preference for spending on social services
and welfare may aﬀect the preferred level of local taxation, but that the level of municipal
spending on physical infrastructure is independent of residents’ religious orientation.
Of course, the quality of the instruments obtained from imposing our exclusion restrictions
is also an empirical question. In particular, to identify public inputs in the tax equation, we
need the speciﬁc grants for local roads to be suﬃciently strongly partially correlated with
spending on local roads. Furthermore, the identiﬁcation of the local business tax rate in
the input equation rests on the partial correlations between the tax rate and the proportion
of church members as well as the related interaction terms. We will discuss the quality of
the instruments when turning to the estimation outcomes.
163.3 Results
Table 2 and 3 present detailed estimation results for a ﬁrst set of system estimations on
tax and public input competition. The spatial metric is W
15km
pop adj, deﬁning as neighbors of a
given community all municipalities with a physical distance of up to 15km. As discussed
above, the metric also gives higher weight to larger municipalities in terms of population
size. As mentioned above, we report results from cross-sectional estimations. To check for
the robustness across years, the tables depict regressions for diﬀerent years.
After excluding the 10 independent cities from the sample, we are left with 1100 cross-
sectional observations. Note that the sample restriction is applied after taking spatial lags.
Hence, while all municipalities are included in the computation of τ−i and s−i, the IV
estimations at the ﬁrst, third and fourth step of the system estimation approach are based
on the restricted sample.
Table 2 reports two columns for each year, where the left one shows estimated coeﬃcients
and corresponding standard errors for the tax equation and the right one depicts the re-
sults for the public input equation. The coeﬃcients of our variables of interest are shown
in the ﬁrst rows. First of all, we note that the coeﬃcient of neighbors’ taxes is positive
and highly signiﬁcant in the tax equation in all reported cross-sections, ranging from 0.20
to 0.31. These results suggest that the municipalities in our sample react to tax policies of
their neighbors by adjusting their own business tax rate towards the level chosen in nearby
jurisdictions.9 Note that this ﬁnding is well in line with the evidence presented in Buet-
tner (2001). However, our results also reveal that there are several other eﬀects at work,
suggesting that the behavior of local governments is much more complex than described in
the earlier empirical tax competition literature. In particular, we ﬁnd a positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of neighbors’ spending on infrastructure on a community’s own
spending level in three out of four cross-sections. The coeﬃcients indicate that a one-Euro
increase in neighbors’ average spending per capita triggers an increase in a municipality’s
own per-capita spending on infrastructure between 18 and 51 Cents. Hence, our ﬁndings
suggest that the municipalities engage in simultaneous tax and public input competition
9In the following, we sometimes interpret the estimates of the strategic eﬀects in terms of reactions of
governments to changes in other municipalities’ policy instruments. Such interpretations always refer to
the partial eﬀects in our static empirical model, and not to any sort of dynamic adjustment.
17Table 2: Tax and public input competition, system estimation using W
15km
pop adj
Cross section 1998 2000 2002 2004
Dependent variable τ s τ s τ s τ s
Neighbors’ tax rate 0.196??? -731?? 0.207??? -1055?? 0.278??? 68.4 0.314??? 60.0
(0.049) (350) (0.049) (427) (0.055) (559) (0.058) (480)
Neighbors’ public input -0.000 0.178? -0.000 0.507??? 0.000 0.237?? 0.000 0.148
(0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.108)
Own tax rate - 3190??? - 2396??? - -2176?? - -171
(801) (924) (1057) (772)
Own public input 0.00002??? - 0.00001??? - 0.000 - -0.000 -
(4D-06) (4D-06) (0.000) (0.000)
Marg. contr. rate 0.098??? -810??? 0.091??? -523 0.065?? 342 0.088??? -469?
(0.029) (302) (0.026) (318) (0.030) (426) (0.030) (276)
Uncond. transfers -0.00002??? 0.241??? -0.00002??? 0.175?? -0.00002??? 0.199?? -0.00004??? 0.215???
(7D-06) (0.070) (6D-06) (0.075) (7D-06) (0.097) (8D-06) (0.075)
Fiscal capacity -0.001 46.0??? -0.002? 87.7??? -0.002? 95.7??? -0.004??? 52.8???
(0.001) (13.5) (0.001) (14.4) (0.001) (15.7) (0.001) (10.5)
Speciﬁc grants - 0.995??? - 1.05??? - 1.30??? - 1.12???
for local roads (0.044) (0.051) (0.047) (0.037)
Other speciﬁc 0.00001? -0.005 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.010 0.00002?? 0.004
grants (7D-06) (0.071) (0.000) (0.073) (0.000) (0.078) (7D-06) (0.060)
Debt service 0.00005??? -0.112 0.00004??? -0.153?? 0.00004??? -0.100 0.00002??? -0.116??
(6D-06) (0.072) (6D-06) (0.074) (5D-06) (0.078) (5D-06) (0.049)
Unemployment -1.01??? 194 -1.27??? 265 -1.50??? -70.3 -1.23??? 166
(0.266) (147) (0.316) (200) (0.344) (280) (0.337) (186)
Population 0.0002??? 0.119 0.0002??? 0.309 0.0002??? 1.02?? 0.0002??? 0.625??
(1,000s) (0.00002) (0.272) (0.00002) (0.308) (0.00002) (0.418) (0.00002) (0.274)
Pop. density 0.000 -22.1?? 0.001 -18.1? 0.000 -6.59 0.000 -7.80
(0.000) (9.25) (0.001) (10.1) (0.000) (11.6) (0.000) (8.17)
% pop.<16 years -0.005 -42.8 -0.004 25.6 -0.005 40.6 -0.015 212?
(0.012) (120) (0.012) (138) (0.012) (165) (0.014) (127)
% pop.>65 years -0.272?? -37.8 -0.187? -112 -0.075 50.4 -0.089 140
(0.111) (98.3) (0.111) (109) (0.111) (124) (0.118) (88.2)
% church members -0.132??? - -0.114??? - -0.115??? - -0.109??? -
(0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032)
% church members× 1.07??? - 1.32??? - 1.57??? - 1.28??? -
unemployment (0.295) (0.352) (0.383) (0.374)
% church members× 0.308?? - 0.219? - 0.108 - 0.107 -
% pop.>65 years (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.130)
R2 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.49
F-tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 110.3 215.7 105.4 199.6 73.6 133.9 94.1 115.0
s−i 77.7 91.2 95.6 104.1 68.0 65.4 49.8 54.7
Own tax rate - 5.0 - 5.8 - 6.9 - 5.4
Own public input 7.3 - 8.7 - 7.7 - 16.6 -
Sample includes all municipalities up to independent cities, Nob=1100. Spatial metric for constructing τ−i and s−i is W15km
pop adj
(see notes in Table 5 for details). Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is from the third step of the estimation procedure (2SLS
after taking account of spatial error correlation). F-tests of excluded IVs are from ﬁrst-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation
in the third step of the estimation procedure. Signiﬁcance levels: ? 10%; ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
for mobile capital.10 A second eﬀect that has not been considered in previous work is that
of neighbors’ taxes on a municipality’s own level of spending on public inputs. In two out
of four cross-sections, we ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, pointing to local
10The positive impact of neighbors’ spending on a municipality’s own spending is unlikely to be driven
by technological externalities since the construction and maintenance of major interconnecting roads and
highways falls into the responsibility the federal government or the states. Our measure of local public input
provision thus includes only spending on roads with a very limited potential impact on the productivity of
capital invested in other municipalities.
18governments increasing their per-capita spending on infrastructure by about 7 to 11 Euros
per capita in reaction to a one percentage point decrease of their neighbors’ average tax
rate. Note that the sign of all these eﬀects are in line with the predictions of the model
discussed in Section 2.
Interestingly, our results also point to direct interaction between ﬁscal variables within a
community: a one percentage point increase in the statutory tax rate triggers an increase
in spending per capita of 32 Euros in 1998 and of 24 Euros in 2000, while in the 2002 cross-
section we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of about 22 Euros. Moreover, for 1998 and 2000 there is a
positive partial eﬀect of public inputs on taxation, indicating that an increase of spending
by 100 Euros per capita would result in a tax rate increase of 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points.
All these ﬁndings support the notion that it is important to account for the fact that not
all policy instruments might be adjustable to optimal levels at all points in time.
Besides the evidence on tax and public input competition, there are additional ﬁndings
that are worth mentioning. Conﬁrming our expectations, the marginal contribution rate
positively aﬀects the tax rate, while unconditional transfers exert a negative impact on
local taxes. Both ﬁndings are in line with Buettner (2006) and support the view that a
higher degree of redistribution within a system of ﬁscal equalization alleviates business
tax competition. In addition, there is evidence for a negative impact of the marginal
contribution rate on public input provision in two out of four cross-sections. This suggests
that ﬁscal equalization counteracts both tax and public input competition. Furthermore,
unconditional transfers are found to positively aﬀect public inputs. An increase of these
transfers by one Euro per capita brings about an increase in infrastructure spending per
capita of 0.18 to 0.24 Euros. Regarding relative ﬁscal capacity, our expectations are also
conﬁrmed: municipalities with higher capacity set lower tax rates and spend more on
public inputs. With respect to the characteristics which are used as instruments in either
the tax or the public input equation, we note that spending on local roads strongly reacts
to the amount of speciﬁc grants received for that purpose. In addition, we ﬁnd at least
two highly signiﬁcant variables capturing the religious orientation of the population in
all cross-sections.11 Finally, we note a positive impact of debt service on local taxes and a
11Note, however, that this ﬁnding is not suﬃcient to rule out a potential problem of weak identiﬁcation.
We comment on this below.
19negative impact on public input provision, and a negative (positive) eﬀect of unemployment
(population) on the tax rate.
Regarding the quality of the instruments, we ﬁrst note that τ−i and s−i are identiﬁed by a
strong partial correlation with ﬁrst and second-order spatial lags of exogenous community
characteristics, resulting in F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the corresponding
ﬁrst-stage regressions larger than 50 in general.12 Hence, we are conﬁdent that our identiﬁ-
cation approach with respect to the spatial eﬀects does not suﬀer from a weak instruments
problem. With respect to a community’s own tax rate and public input as endogenous ex-
planatory variables, we ﬁrst checked the performance of the instruments in the ﬁrst stage
regression in terms of statistical signiﬁcance. The speciﬁc-grants variable is always highly
signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage regression of public inputs on the set of instruments, with t-
statistics around 10. In the ﬁrst-stage regression of the tax rate, both the proportion of
church members and the interaction with the rate of unemployment are generally signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level. However, since the F-statistics for a community’s own tax rate and
public input are relatively small, we also checked the critical values for the Stock-Yogo
weak identiﬁcation test. We were able to reject the null that the bias of our IV estimation
exceeds 20% of the bias in the corresponding OLS estimation in all cases, lending further
support to our identiﬁcation strategy.
The spatial metric used in the estimations reported in Table 2 assigns 23 neighbors on
average to each municipality. In addition, there is substantial variation in the number of
neighbors, ranging from one to 54. As a ﬁrst robustness check of our ﬁndings with respect
to the deﬁnition of neighborliness among municipalities, Table 3 reports results of the same
estimations as before, with the metric W
10 nearest
pop adj based on the deﬁnition of the 10 nearest
communities (in terms of physical distance) as neighbors, weighted by population.
A ﬁrst point to mention is that all main eﬀects from Table 2 are robust to the change in
the metric. The eﬀect of neighbors’ taxes on a municipality’s own tax rate is estimated
to be signiﬁcantly positive but somewhat smaller than before, ranging from 0.16 to 0.21.
The impact of neighbors’ spending on infrastructure on the local provision of public inputs
is of similar size as before, with estimated coeﬃcients ranging from 0.22 to 0.39. The
12We refer to the 2SLS estimation that is performed as the third step of the estimation procedure.
20Table 3: Tax and public input competition, system estimation using W
10 nearest
pop adj
Cross section 1998 2000 2002 2004
Dependent variable τ s τ s τ s τ s
Neighbors’ tax rate 0.158??? -678? 0.177??? -796? 0.212??? -604 0.213??? -1412???
(0.041) (398) (0.040) (481) (0.040) (503) (0.044) (373)
Neighbors’ public input -0.000 0.086 0.000 0.389??? 0.00001? 0.134 -0.000 0.217???
(0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.075) (7D-06) (0.086) (0.000) (0.080)
Own tax rate - 3039??? - 1276 - -560 - 3283???
(821) (923) (1066) (800)
Own public input 0.00002??? - 0.00001? - 0.000 - 0.000 -
(4D-06) (4D-06) (0.000) (0.000)
Marg. contr. rate 0.089??? -774?? 0.080??? -470 0.089??? 120 0.098??? -763???
(0.028) (303) (0.025) (323) (0.029) (433) (0.029) (289)
Uncond. transfers -0.00002??? 0.225??? -0.00002??? 0.170?? -0.00002??? 0.265??? -0.00004??? 0.304???
(7D-06) (0.071) (6D-06) (0.073) (7D-06) (0.09) (8D-06) (0.080)
Fiscal capacity -0.001 45.7??? -0.003?? 85.2??? -0.003?? 100??? -0.004??? 62.4???
(0.001) (13.4) (0.001) (14.2) (0.001) (15.5) (0.001) (10.6)
Speciﬁc grants - 0.999??? - 1.05??? - 1.30??? - 1.10???
for local roads (0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.038)
Other speciﬁc 0.00001? -0.004 0.00001? 0.064 0.00001? 0.003 0.00001? -0.060
grants (7D-06) (0.071) (6D-06) (0.073) (6D-06) (0.078) (7D-06) (0.062)
Debt service 0.00004??? -0.096 0.00004??? -0.089 0.00003??? -0.153?? 0.00002??? -0.194???
(6D-06) (0.072) (6D-06) (0.074) (5D-06) (0.077) (5D-06) (0.048)
Unemployment -0.961??? 189 -1.10??? 187 -1.18??? 93.7 -0.913??? 425???
(0.264) (140) (0.312) (183) (0.334) (248) (0.316) (157)
Population 0.0002??? 0.169 0.0002??? 0.315 0.0002??? 0.585 0.0002??? 0.027
(1,000s) (0.00002) (0.267) (0.00002) (0.275) (0.00002) (0.3759) (0.00002) (0.272)
Pop. density 0.000 -26.8??? 0.000 -22.8?? -0.000 -12.7 -0.000 -12.3
(0.000) (8.45) (0.000) (9.29) (0.000) (10.5) (0.000) (7.56)
% pop.<16 years -0.003 -9.84 -0.000 51.8 -0.001 80.9 -0.007 241?
(0.012) (118) (0.011) (136) (0.012) (163) (0.014) (128)
% pop.>65 years -0.248?? -7.39 -0.198? -52.5 -0.094 77.1 -0.025 115
(0.110) (97.0) (0.110) (107) (0.109) (120) (0.112) (87.8)
% church members -0.124??? - -0.106??? - -0.100??? - -0.077?? -
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
% church members× 1.02??? - 1.16??? - 1.25??? - 0.965??? -
unemployment (0.294) (0.349) (0.372) (0.351)
% church members× 0.280?? - 0.229? - 0.126 - 0.037 -
% pop.>65 years (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.124)
R2 0.21 0.38 0.22 0.39 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.48
F-tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 77.0 76.1 76.3 63.2 69.0 63.4 88.6 93.7
s−i 72.6 78.7 67.1 63.9 38.9 33.7 37.5 36.8
Own tax rate - 4.9 - 5.8 - 5.7 - 4.1
Own public input 6.9 - 9.5 - 7.1 - 14.7 -
Sample includes all municipalities up to independent cities, Nob=1100. Spatial metric for constructing τ−i and s−i is
W10 nearest
pop adj (see notes in Table 5 for details). Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is from the third step of the estimation
procedure (2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F-tests of excluded IVs are from ﬁrst-stage regressions of
the 2SLS estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure. Signiﬁcance levels: ? 10%; ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
results also conﬁrm the ﬁnding that the municipalities take into account the level of taxes
among neighbors when choosing their level of spending on the local road network. Even
with respect to the strength of the interaction, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence
compared to the results reported in Table 2. A brief inspection of the evidence regarding
the control variables reveals that the eﬀects mentioned above are highly robust to the
change in the metric, too.
21Table 4: Tax and public input competition, system estimation after between-transformation,
Spatial metric W15km
pop adj W10 nearest
pop adj
Dependent variable τ s τ s
Neighbors’ tax rate 0.263??? -387 0.211??? -505?
(0.050) (352) (0.039) (263)
Neighbors’ public input -0.000 0.328??? -0.000 0.215???
(0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.060)
Own tax rate - 1658??? - 1591??
(568) (632)
Own public input 0.00002??? - 0.00001??? -
(5D-06) (5D-06)
Marginal contribution rate 0.098??? -372 0.093?? -438
(0.037) (278) (0.036) (282)
Unconditional transfers -0.00003??? 0.261??? -0.00003??? 0.259???
(7D-06) (0.054) (7D-06) (0.057)
Fiscal capacity -0.002 87.7??? -0.003?? 84.7???
(0.002) (11.7) (0.001) (11.8)
Speciﬁc grants for local roads - 1.17??? - 1.17???
(0.044) (0.044)
Other speciﬁc grants 0.00001? 0.016 0.00001? 0.019
(7D-06) (0.047) (6D-06) (0.048)
Debt service 0.00004??? -0.166??? 0.00004??? -0.153???
(6D-06) (0.050) (6D-06) (0.050)
Unemployment -1.41??? 179 -1.15??? 232?
(0.314) (147) (0.306) (134)
Population (1,000s) 0.0002??? 0.133 0.0002??? 0.198
(0.00002) (0.203) (0.00002) (0.228)
Pop. density 0.000 -8.43 0.000 -15.8??
(0.000) (6.38) (0.000) (6.19)
% pop.<16 years -0.010 90.6 -0.004 109
(0.013) (94.7) (0.013) (94.6)
% pop.>65 years -0.141 -4.47 -0.135 25.8
(0.108) (70.3) (0.107) (69.6)
% church members -0.127??? - -0.109??? -
(0.028) (0.027)
% church members×unemployment 1.47??? - 1.21??? -
(0.349) (0.340)
% church members×% pop.>65 years 0.165 - 0.158 -
(0.120) (0.118)
R2 0.22 0.48 0.22 0.39
F-tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 108.2 149.1 81.2 91.1
s−i 124.0 123.8 83.5 79.9
Own tax rate - 6.3 - 6.0
Own public input 15.9 - 16.5 -
Sample includes observations for all municipalities up to independent cities after between-transformation using years 1998,
2000, 2002, and 2004, Nob=1100. Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is from the third step of the estimation procedure
(2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F-tests of excluded IVs are from ﬁrst-stage regressions of the 2SLS
estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure. Signiﬁcance levels: ? 10%; ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
To some extent, the evidence on tax and public input competition depends on which
cross-sections are used for estimation, and it might therefore be useful to have a look on
average eﬀects. Table 4 reports the results of a system estimation after applying a between-
transformation, i.e. after taking averages of all variables over time. Using t = 1,...,T as
22the index of time periods, the transformed system reads
¯ τi = θτ¯ si + λτ¯ τ−i + ϕτ¯ s−i + βτ ¯ Xτi + ¯ ui (17)
¯ si = θs¯ τi + λs¯ τ−i + ϕs¯ s−i + βs ¯ Xsi + ¯ vi, (18)
where ¯ τi = T −1 P
t τit, ¯ Xi = T −1 P
t Xit, ¯ τ−i =
P
j wij¯ τj, etc. The between-estimations
conﬁrm the presence of direct strategic interaction in the choice of taxes and public inputs.
Using W
15km
pop adj as the spatial metric, we ﬁnd an average direct tax competition eﬀect of 0.263
and a direct public input competition eﬀect of 0.211. With W
10 nearest
pop adj , the corresponding
point estimates are 0.328 and 0.215, respectively.
The result regarding the impact of neighbors’ taxes on own spending on infrastructure is
mixed: the null of no interaction cannot be rejected under the metric W
15km
pop adj, but it is
rejected under W
10 nearest
pop adj at the 10% level of signiﬁcance. However, the magnitude of the
estimated eﬀect is rather small.
3.4 Robustness
The results discussed so far have been derived under speciﬁc assumptions with respect to
spatial metrics. In related applications it has been shown that the choice of the metric may
be of critical importance (Baicker, 2005), and it therefore seems to be warranted to discuss
the issue in more detail.
While choosing a metric based on some geographical deﬁnition of neighborliness seems to
be accepted as a general rule in applications involving local jurisdictions (Buettner, 2001,
2003), no consensus has evolved how to exactly specify the weights. However, as argued
by Conley (1999), in many cases the application itself suggests a certain strategy. In our
case, for instance, the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the jurisdictions’ size together with the fact
that the key issue driving local governments into strategic interaction is a ﬁscal externality
warrant to include some measure of size. Moreover, there are also technical aspects that
need to be considered. As shown in the descriptive statistics (Table 1), the cross-sectional
variation of the tax rate is rather limited. Taking averages over neighboring jurisdictions’
tax rates will, of course, give a variable with even smaller variation. This problem can
23Table 5: Neighbors’ tax rates and infrastructure spending for diﬀerent spatial metrics, year 2000
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Spatial metric τ−i s−i τ−i s−i τ−i s−i τ−i s−i
W
15km
uniform 0.167 140 0.0030 31.3 0.160 76.3 0.177 253
W
15km
inverse 0.167 139 0.0032 33.6 0.159 68.8 0.182 329
W
10 nearest
uniform 0.167 139 0.0034 37.4 0.157 66.0 0.181 332
W
10 nearest
inverse 0.167 139 0.0036 40.6 0.156 66.9 0.182 465
W
15km
pop adj 0.171 147 0.0068 28.9 0.160 83.7 0.198 281
W
10 nearest
pop adj 0.169 146 0.0066 35.4 0.156 72.0 0.204 326
W15km
uniform: Municipalities with distance <15km deﬁned as neighbors, weights uniform. W15km
inverse: Municipalities with distance
<15km deﬁned as neighbors, weights based on inverse distance. W10 nearest
uniform : 10 geographically closest municipalities deﬁned
as neighbors, weights uniform. W10 nearest
inverse : 10 geographically closest municipalities deﬁned as neighbors, weights based on
inverse distance. W15km
pop adj: Municipalities with distance <15km deﬁned as neighbors, weights based on relative population
size. W10 nearest
pop adj : 10 geographically closest municipalities deﬁned as neighbors, weights based on relative population size. All
weight matrices are row-standardized.
be expected to become the more severe the more municipalities are, on average, deﬁned
as neighbors for a given community. In fact, with suﬃciently many communities included
in the calculation of neighbors’ taxes, τ−i will quickly converge towards the regional (or
even the statewide) average of taxes. Deﬁning many municipalities as neighbors for a given
community will thus result in τ−i becoming a poor measure for the tax eﬀort of nearby
municipalities.
To exemplify the last point, we have assembled in Table 5 some descriptive statistics for
neighbors’ average tax rates (τ−i) and neighbors’ expenditures on infrastructure (s−i) ac-
cording to diﬀerent spatial metrics (based on data for the year 2000).
The ﬁrst four rows depict statistics for spatial metrics that take either the municipalities
within a distance of up to 15km or the 10 geographically closest municipalities to be
neighbors of a given municipality. Irrespective of whether we take the weights of neighbors
to be uniform or to be deﬁned based on the inverse of the great circle distance, the variable
capturing the average tax rate of neighbors shows very limited variation. With uniform
weights assigned to municipalities within a distance up to 15km, for instance, the variation
in neighbors’ average tax rate is actually modest, with a minimum of 0.16 and a maximum
of 0.177. However, if we account for asymmetries in population size (last two rows), the
variation in the resulting series is signiﬁcantly higher. Note that, due to higher variation
in local expenditures per capita, the computation of neighbors’ spending on infrastructure










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Based on the preceding discussion, we expect the estimates regarding the impact of τ−i to
critically depend on the choice of the spatial metric. In contrast, the estimates regarding the
coeﬃcient of s−i should be more robust to the deﬁnition of neighbors. To check to what
degree this presumption is supported by our data, we estimated our system of reaction
functions using the diﬀerent spatial metrics. Table 6 gives an overview on the estimated
coeﬃcients of interest for a number of cross-sections.








inverse results in very large estimates
of λτ compared to W
15km
pop adj and W
10 nearest
pop adj . This is well in line with our expectations, as
the variation in τ−i tends to be low (recall that, with the weight matrix approaching a
matrix of uniform weights for all other municipalities, τ−i becomes a constant measuring
the average tax rate among all communities). Note that for our system of equations to be
stable, λτ is required to be smaller than one in absolute value. There are two estimations
based on the 2004 cross-section where this requirement is barely met, adding further doubt
about the appropriateness of spatial metrics that deﬁne ‘large’ sets of neighbors and that
do not account for the municipalities’ relative population size. It is also worth mentioning
that the estimate for the interaction eﬀect in public input provision, ϕs, is much more
robust to changes regarding the spatial metric. Noting that the variation in spending on
infrastructure is much higher than the variation in tax rates, and that deﬁning a composite
neighbor from a large set of communities should therefore be less of a technical problem, it is
reassuring that the conclusions regarding public input competition are not critically aﬀected
by the choice of a spatial metric that deﬁnes either smaller or larger sets of neighbors.
4 Conclusions
Although it seems natural to think of governments’ choices regarding taxes and public
inputs as alternative means to attract mobile capital, most of the literature on ﬁscal com-
petition has focused either on taxes or on expenditures. This study oﬀers a comprehensive
treatment of tax and public input competition, with a focus on the strategic interaction
between governments in simultaneously choosing both policy instruments. We use a sim-
26ple theoretical model to characterize the two-dimensional system of tax and public input
reaction functions. We then test the predictions of the model with respect to the strategic
behavior of governments. Using a systems estimator for spatially interrelated equations,
we show that the ﬁscal policies of local jurisdictions in Germany are well in line with the
model’s predictions.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the behavior of local jurisdictions is much more complex than
described by the earlier empirical literature on ﬁscal competition. In particular, the es-
timation results of our system of interrelated equations show a positive and signiﬁcant
direct interaction eﬀect in the local business tax rate. Municipalities facing competition
by low-tax jurisdictions thus set lower taxes than municipalities with high-tax neighbors.
Secondly, the local governments also adjust their level of spending on infrastructure to-
wards the average level among neighboring jurisdictions. For our preferred speciﬁcations,
the direct interaction eﬀect in public input provision is statistically diﬀerent from zero in 10
out of 14 cross-sections, and it tends to be larger than the direct interaction eﬀect in taxes.
Moreover, treating taxes and public inputs as alternative means to attract capital reveals
that the municipalities react to competition in a rather ﬂexible way: if neighbors lower
their taxes, a municipality not only adjusts its own tax rate, but also increases its level of
public input provision. Finally, we demonstrate that our results depend on the choice of
the spatial spatial metric in a predictable way, and that all main results are robust across
various cross-sections.
Several lines of further research seem to be promising. First of all, it would be interesting
to compare our results to evidence regarding tax and expenditure competition from other
countries. Depending on the institutional environment, taking into account diﬀerent policy
instruments could yield further insights into the rather complex process of ﬁscal policy
decision making at the local level. For instance, with respect to the US, our ﬁndings
suggest to treat local property taxes and local expenditures for public schools as well as
public safety as jointly determined endogenous variables. Moreover, we think that some of
the recently proposed improvements regarding spatial estimation techniques can fruitfully
be applied in cases that are of interest both from an academic and from a policy perspective.
Further advances towards estimation techniques for systems of interrelated equations and
panel data would therefore be highly welcome.
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Appendix
The system (7) under symmetry
































In order to derive the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we form the ﬁrst order conditions of
(6) with respect to the tax rate,
ti =
(g2












In the next step, we proceed analogously for public inputs, i.e. we form the ﬁrst order




b2k4 + 4bk2 + 8tk − bk2
2k
. (A.4)
Combining (A.3) and (A.4) provides us with the Nash equilibrium values of
g
∗ = 2/k, t
∗ = (bk
2 + 4)/(2k). (A.5)
Suﬃcient conditions
We have to check that the second derivatives of the welfare function with respect to own
instruments are negative at the symmetric equilibrium. To see this, note that
∂2Ui
∂ti∂ti













b(bk2 + 7) + 4
k2
4b2 < 0. (A.7)





Since this expression is positive, all suﬃcient conditions for a maximum are met.
31Stability
To address the issue of stability of the symmetric equilibrium, we take a look at the slopes
of the reaction functions, given in (10) and (11). There, we see that (bk2 − 4)/3bk2,
−(bk2−4)/3bk2, −4/3bk2 and 4/3bk2 are all less than one in absolute value for any b > 4/k2,
the condition imposed in the main text. Note furthermore that due to the symmetric
marginal reaction of capital to both instruments from (4), it is possible to determine the
slope of a ‘net policy response function’ by adding the absolute values of the slopes of
both of i’s reactions to a marginal change in one of j’s instruments. They add to 1/3,
demonstrating stability in the policy response around the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
To give an example, a marginally higher public input in j triggers a reaction in i’s tax
instrument with slope −(bk2−4)/3bk2 and a reaction in the public input with slope 4/3bk2.
From (3), we know that the tax response aﬀects capital in just the opposite direction than
the public input response, so adding both terms in absolute values gives us the combined
‘policy response’ slope of 1/3.
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